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ABSTRACT

Economists have regarded anti-hoardin g laws as irrational
reactions to non-existen t monopoly in the storage of grain.

In this

paper, we show that anti-hoardin g laws cannot be rationally directed
against a monopolisti c storer, for he will always store less, not more,

than would be stored under competition .

But seemingly perverse competitive

storage, in the form of excessive stockholdin g, can arise when a price
ceiling distorts the market.

Additional public storage exacerbates this

perverse private behavior, and may even induce behavior that appears to
be active market manipulatio n.

Under such circumstanc es, anti-hoardin g

laws can be a desirable second-best policy.

ANTI-HOARDING LAWS:

A STOCK CONDEMNATION RE-ASSAYED*

Brian D. Wright and Jeffrey

c.

Williams

Yale University and Brandeis University

One of the most ancient and persistent concerns of public policy
has been regulation of traders involved in the purchase, storage, and
resale of grain.

In England up to the seventeenth century, for example,

purchase of grain with the intention of resale in the same market at a later
date was commonly forbidden, or allowed only when the price was below a
specified level. 1

In modern times anti-hoarding laws have been enforced

frequently in periods of scarcity.

Over the last forty years in India and

Pakistan, for example, public authorities have repeatedly taken measures
against hoarding.

2

Economists have inferred that anti-hoarding laws are directed
against monopoly in the handling of grain, or more specifically, against
price-manipulating behavior by private starers who, by withholding excessive
amounts of grain, decrease supply below its socially optimal level.

Adam

Smith (1784), for one, accepts that these laws are concerned with
monopoly.

One argument he makes against them is that corn merchants are

too n\DDerous to collude, although this argument is disputed by Rashid
(1980) who offers historical evidence to the contrary.

Smith, however,

further argues that, even if storage is monopolized, excessive hoarding
will not occur.

He reasons that "the corn merchant himself is likely to

suffer the most by this excess of avarice••• from the quantity of corn
which it necessarily leaves upon his hands in the end of the season, and
which, if the next season happens to prove favourable, he must always sell
for a much lower price than he might otherwise have had" (Vol. 2, p. 293).

2

Satisfied anti-hoardin g laws are not justified as an attack against storage
monopoly, he concludes that "The popular fear of engrossing and forestalling
may be compared to the popular terrors and suspicions of witchcraft" (Vol. 2,
p. 309).

In this paper we re-examine the case for anti-hoardin g laws.

We

use a stochastic dynamic programming approach to confirm that a storage
monopolist will not withhold grain excessively , though he will decrease
consumption in times of scarcity.
justificatio ns.

But anti-hoardi ng laws might have other

In fact, we show that anti-hoardin gs laws may be socially

desirable when price ceilings are imposed on the grain trade, as they
frequently have. been.

3

Price ceilings and related measures can induce

competitive starers to withhold their grain during even the worst shortages,
and to exhibit seemingly manipulativ e behavior.

1.

Competitive Storage
In this analysis we assume a closed economy with a storable connnodity
Consider first the case

subject to a random disturbance in production.

where starers are risk-neutra l atomistic price-taker s with rational
expectation s.

Profit-maxim izing storage behavior is an inherently inter

temporal problem because storage, like other forms of investment, connects
one period with the next.

In an undistorted economy with infinite

horizon, the necessary conditions for competitive storage, which are also
the necessary conditions for socially optimal storage, are:

,
(1)

P + K' = (1 + r)-l E [P t+l ]
t
t

,

4

3

where

Et

is the expectational operator conditional on the information

available at time t, r

is the interest rate, and

marginal cost of storage.

Price

Pt

K'

is the net

is given by the inverse consumption

demand function

,

(2)

where
period

ht

P' < 0

is the amount stored from period

is the harvest and

to

t

t+l •
Implicit in these conditions is a function relating competitive

storage to the amount available:

,

(3)

where the amount available, I t , is given by
(4)

The implications of competitive storage have been examined by Wright and
Williams (1982a), who use numerical methods to derive
function of

as a

C
St, and thereby derive the storage behavior for zero and

positive supply elasticities.
2.

Et[Pt+l]
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Monopolistic Storage
In most agricultural markets the number of producers is large.

In

contrast, the market for the supply of storage services may be highly
concentrated, in which case storers might try to extract some supernormal
profits from their operations.

When there is only one storer, or when

cooperation is perfect, the limiting case of a storage monopoly occurs.
If it existed, would such a monopoly justify an anti-hoarding law?

4

In discussing the behavior of the storage monopolist, it is
convenient to proceEd as if he sells all his stock and then rebuys the
amount he wants to store till the next period.
shrinkage are ignored.)

(Handling costs and

Expected monopoly profits in the infinite horizon

case·are given by
(5)
An expected-pr ofit maximizing 110nopolist must consider that each additional

unit stored depresses his retum on preceding units and that the opportunity
cost of each additional unit put into store is the marginal expenditure ,
which of course will be higher than the price.

A

monopolist, with

rational expectation s, will also recognize the effects of his current
actions on his stream of future profits.

The more he stores this period,

the greater will be the availabilit y and the larger will be his profits next
period.

The prospect for greater storage next period will in turn lead to

higher expected profits in even more distant in even more distant periods.
Thus a monopolisti c storer follows the arbitrage conditions:

'
(6)

MX

t

+

K' •

'

denotes marginal revenue which equals

astEt[Pt+l]
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t
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profits,future
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Using a numerical approach analogous to
as a function of

in the competitive
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as function s of

From

m
these, the amount stored by the monopo list, St, is derived as a function

of the amount availab le:

,

(7)

At first glance, it might not be clear why a monopol ist is concerne d
with margina l expendi ture in period

t

rather than margina l revenue .

If

his problem were the allocati on of total supply among p'eriods , he would
in fact be conceme d with margina l revenue in the current period.

But if

one party controll ed all distribu tion such that consumers could buy only
from him, it is by no means obvious that he would store anythin~ at all.
When the demand curve is inelast ic over the relevan t range of supply, a
monopo list over distribu tion will want to restric t supply to an infinite simal
amount or to an amount where demand becomes elastic.

6

He would not incur

additio nal charges to store the crop but would destroy it.

A monopo list

over distribu tion would store only when be was somehow constrai ned from
destroyi ng supplie s, although a more plausib le reaction would be for him
to maneuve r to restric t product ion.

If the disturba nce in product ion is

small, the monopo list will rationa lly store only if consump tion demand is
locally elastic , which is surely not the case for staple foodstu ffs.
(In any case, the more elastic the demand, the less role there is for
storage , even under competi tion.)
Because a monopo list over distribu tion is most likely to be
destroyi ng crops or restrict ing planting s, the likely legal response
would be anti-des truction laws and laws against limiting product ion.
If anti-hoa rding laws are directed against some form of monopoly, the

...._--·:·...: ..

6

monopoly power must be over only storage, not over the entire system of
distribution.
consumption.

A storage monopolist competes in the market for current
Hence he pays attention to the marginal expenditure on what

he puts into store, as seen in equation (6).
3.

Comparison of Competitive and Monopolistic Storage Behavior
The storage rules for both competition and monopoly depend in

practice on the particular demand curve. the supply elasticity, the
variability of the harvest, the interest rate, and storage costs.

An

important fact about real-world grain storage is that the net marginal
cost of storage is not linear, and more important, becomes negative
as storage falls below medium levels.

Working (1953) identified such a

nonlinear relation for the cost of storage in a study relating the spread
between the spot price and the new-crop futures price to the level of
wheat stocks at the end of the crop year.

Subsequent studies have confirmed

Working's findings for many other commodities.
One reason for the negative marginal cost of storage at low levels
of availability is that stocks have "convenience yield" or accessibility
value to processors and other intermediate users, because either inflows or
outflows are not predictable and the expected cost of running out is
sufficiently high.

For much the same reason people hold currency at the

cost of foregone interest.

7

A related reason is that the cost of transport

or transformation of stocks may rise as stocks fall, so that the net
11arginal cost of storage becomes negative at low levels of stocks.
is observed, for example, in grain stocks held in barges.

This

Because of the

positive relation between barge speed and cost of transport, and the

7

negative relation between speed· and total floating inventory, at
sµfficiently low levels of the latter a negative net marginal storage
cost occurs.

Thus some grain is found on barges even when prices are

failling.
To compare competitive and monopolistic storage, we use the following
example.

Suppose consumption demand has a constant elasticity of -0.2

in every period, and the real interest rate, r , is constant at 5%.
harvest, supplied by atomistic competitive farmers, is

vt
Let

.

.
h(l + vt)

The
where

his the same every period.

is a serially uncorrelated disturbance, and

have a five-point distribution of -20%, -10%, 0%, +10%, and +20%

vt

.05, .20, .50, .20, and .05 respectively, a harvest

with probabilities

sufficiently variable to provide considerable contrast between competitive
and monopolistic storage.
in the harvest as

.

Define the market equilibrium with no uncertainty

h • 100 tons, P • $100.

Following the recent empirical

study of Gray and Peck (1981) of the Chicago wheat market, we chose a
piecewise linear functional form for marginal storage cost, as shown in
Figure 1.
The storage rules for both competition and monopoly derived
numerically for this example are shown in Figure 2.
a dramatic effect on carryover behavior.

Obviously monopoly has

The marginal propensity to store

is greatly reduced, to less than one-half that of competitive storage, and
storage begins at a higher level of availability.

8

Since this result is derived numerically, a simplified analytical
example may help the reader to appreciate the underlying economic
rationale.

Consider a two-period case with a small perfectly anticipated

production disturbance +Zin the first period,
production is fixed at
period price of

.
h,

-z

in the second.

If planned

a linear inverse demand function yields a first

8

where

A

A

A

Pl• P(h) + Z h(l - s) P'(h)

(8}

perio d,
is the fracti on of exces s produ ction store d in the first

s

and relea sed from stora ge in the secon d perio d.

Price in the secon d

perio d is
A

A

A

P 2 • P(h) - Z h(l - s)P'(h )

(9)

inter est expen ses
The profi t from stora ge, assum ing no carry ing charg es or
s at
n • -(-Zs P1 ) + ZsP 2 • Profit -maxi mizin g mono polist ic stora ge occur
is
2
an
is• Z hP'[2 (2s - 1)) • O

(10)
Thus

s • 0.5.

On

the other hand under atom istic comp etitio n

(11)
Subs tituti ng from (8) and (9),
case.

the solut ion is

s • 1.0

in this

that
So the margi nal prope nsity to store under monopoly is half

under comp etitio n.

The differ ence in stora ge prope nsitie s in this simpl e

our nume rical
exerc ise is simil ar to that seen in the resul ts deriv ed from
horiz on, and the
mode l, which is more reali stic in that it has an infin ite
ce.
seque nce of distur bance s is not conve nientl y known in advan
less
Obvio usly at all level s of avail abili ty the mono polist holds
than comp etitiv e store rs.

The common contr ary presu mptio n that a storag e

by exces sive
monopoly restr icts the suppl y of grain durin g scarc ities
stati c textbo ok case
withh oldin g follow s plaus ibly from consi derat ion of the
a finit e and negat ive
of the profit -maxi mizin g behav ior of a singl e firm with

9

elasticity of demand for its product.
storage monopolist supplies.

The confusion arises over what the

He does not extract his extra profits by

keeping grain off the market to keep the price high but by restricting his
output, his output being the provision of storage.

A storer must, ignoring

shrinkage, expect to sell at some point any grain he buys.

The rule

"buy low, hold high"•is no more conducive to success for a storage nomopolist
than for a price-taker.

Hence the true offense of a monopolistic storer

is the exact reverse of the standard charge of over-withholdin g.

The

monopolist is not innocent because he withholds no more than competitive
storers, as Adam Smith suggests, but guilty because he withholds too little
at all levels of availability!
This comparison of storage rules actually understates the case that
a monopolist stores too little because it considers storage behavior at
equal availabilities.

But the amount available in one period depends in

part on the storage in the previous period, and this means the monopolist's
low storage will feed on itself.

As an illustration of this cumulative effect,

consider what a monopolist and an industry of competitive storers would be
storing after a string of normal harvests (i.e., harvests when the disturbance
v

is O).

Both will reach a period when they store the same amo\lllt as in

the previous period.

For competitors this amount would be

for the monopolist only 2.2 tons.

9.1 tons, but

While this accumulation proceeds,

consumption is actually higher under monopolistic storage than competitive
storage.

The advantage of competitive storage becomes clear only when a

disastrous harvest interrupts the string of normal ones.

Because of the extra

stock available under competition, consumption is higher than llllder monopoly

J
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in these bad periods.

The cumulative effect of monopoly on stocks can

also be seen with the help of a simulation using a series of 7500 random draws
for the disturbance in production.

Under competition mean storage is 11.3

tons while under monopoly it is only 4.5 tons.

Not surprisingl y the

variability of price and consumption is considerabl y higher with monopoly.
Under competition , standard deviations of consumption and price are 4.6 and
29.2 respectivel y; the equivalent figures under monopoly are 7.9 and 48.0.
4.

An Alternative Cause for Excessive Withholding

A monopolist' s storage behavior is the opposite of that at
which the ancient and modem prosecution of hoarders appears to be directed.
But does this imply that such measures are misguided, or are there other
reasons for such interventio ns in the private storage blarket?

Although

excessive withholding in times of scarcity is not consistent with monopoly,
it.can occur under another distortion commonly found in grain markets
ancient and modem, namely an implicit or explicit price ceiling.
A price ceiling constrains the return storers can obtain for their
holdings.

If, as is usually the case, storers are "middle men" such

as millers and shippers, then the price ceiling also puts a ceiling on
the cost of their input into storage, or their shadow price of what they
retain in inventory.

Consequentl y they adjust their arbitrage conditions

to reflect these distorted prices, and so change their storage behavior.
To illustrate these responses, we considered the case where a ceiling
of $112.50 is imposed.

9 As Figure 2 shows, this price ceiling induces a

significant change in competitive storage behavior - a positive amount
is stored no matter how great the scarcity.

11

At last here is the kind of over-with holding during scarcity consisten t
with historica l complaint s and penalties .

Why competiti ve storers retain some

stocks during scarcitie s can be explained using Figure 3.

The marginal

return to a unit stored is the spread between the price expected in the next
period, appropria tely discounte d, and the current market price.

At

any level of availabil ity below 100.S tons, the ectnilibriu m market spread,
-$14.48, is equal to the marginal storage cost of 3.2 tons, this cost being
negative because of the high convenien ce yield of that amount of storage.

Because of this negative storage cost, private storers might as well hold
Conseque ntly,

grain as sell it in the current period at the price ceiling.

competiti ve storage is socially excessive below an availabil ity of 96.8 tons,
as can be seen in compariso n with the "shadow spread" curve, calculate d from
the marginal social value of storage instead of the distorted market price.
Above 96.8 tons availabil ity, the shadow spread is above the market spread,
and this implies private storage is deficient over that range.

At very

high levels of availabil ity the possibili ty that the price ceiling might be
hit in the next period becomes remote, so the social and private spreads
converge.
5.

10

Private Storage with Public Storage
One way to prevent this sub-optim al private storage behavior would

be simply to remove the price ceiling, which, besides distortin g storage,
also discourag es productio n when it is responsiv e to price.

Removing a

price ceiling may be infeasibl e in practice, because of political pressure
or because the ceiling confo:rms with the governme nt's distribut ional
objective s.

Moreover, it may be impossibl e for the governmen t to convince

starers that it would never impose a price ceiling, since the governmen t

12

is subject to no higher authority forcing it to keep its promises.

A

possible remedy for the distortions of price ceilings is direct participation
in the storage activity.

The types of public storage schemes frequently observed

may prompt unusual behavior on the part of private storers because of the
government's frequently arbitrary or inefficient formulation and operation
of its rules.

But even an efficient decentralized public storage authority

whose managers use the shadow price of consumption

P

(the price of a

tradeable ration coupon plus the market price) rather than the market price
as their guide can induce competitive private storage that would likely be
characterized as manipulative or monopolistic.
To solve simultaneously for competitive private and public storage,
it is necessary to obtain an equilibrium where both the public and private
arbitrage conditions hold.
+ K' (S 8 )
P(I -sg - Sc)
t .
g t
t t

For public storage:
..

~ Et(Pt+l)[l + r]

-1

sg • o

,

t

(12)
A

+ K' (Sg) • Et(Pt+l)[l + r]
.· P(I t -sgt - Sc)
t
g t
where K'

g

-1

sg

'

t

represents the marginal cost of public storage.

>

o

The private

storers take the government's actions as given and follow:

(13)
(p

= Et

where
and K'C

-1
t+l ) (1 + r)

,

P denotes the distorted market price faced by private storers,
their net marginal storage costs.
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Because a public stockpile is not owned by processor s, it may offer
little or no convenien ce yield.

Consequen tly the net marginal storage

costs of private stocks may be below those of the public stockpile , and
it is possible that private storers will hold some stocks even though the
price ceiling depresses their return

...

P

relative to the "shadow incentive "

Of course if there were no price

P for governmen t storage activity.

ceiling, there would be only private storage under these circumsta nces.
Because of the price ceiling and the interactio n of public and
private storage, withholdi ng and even accumulat ion in a tight market might
be rational for competiti ve storers.

This can be illustrate d with the
is constant at $2.50

numerical example used above, assuming that
per period, and

is the nonlinear function presented in Figure 1.

The private and public storage rules, given a price ceiling of $112.50
and these storage costs, are shown in Figure 4.

The interacti on of public

and private storage is complex indeed.
Government intervent ion increases total storage.

Mean storage, public

and private together, is 12.2 tons, while when private storage alone is
allowed mean storage is 9.9 tons.
private storage is 11.3 tons.)
private storage.

(If there is no price ceiling, mean

But part of public storage simply replaces

Mean public storage is 4.9 tons and this implies that on

average 53 percent of public storage substitut es for private storage, the
mean of which falls to 7.3 from 9.9 tons.

This happens because over the

higher availabi lities, public storage depresses private storage.
In times of scarcity, because of the anticipat ed public demand for
grain to store in future periods, private storers can expect a higher

14

average market price for what they themselv es store.

When their alternat ive

is selling at the price ceiling in the current period, this higher expected
price induces them to hold even more off the market (at negative net storage
cost) than if there were no public interven tion in the storage activity .
In Figure 2, private storage is 3.2 tons under the price ceiling , while in
Figure 4 it is 4.1 tons.

In short, government interven tion exacerb ates

the excessiv e withhold ing of private starers when price is at the ceiling.
But the presence of public storage introduc es a new, dynamic
dimensio n to appenre ntly perverse private storage behavio r.

Note that

over a certain range of availab ilities, private storage will actually be
less than at extremel y low amounts availab le.

Figure 4 shows that if a

poor harvest follows a normal one, and price rises, private storers may
actually accumul ate stocks even as a public authorit y is reducing its
holding s.

For example, if the availab ility was approxim ately 102.5 the

previou s period and is 95.1 this period, observed private storage would
be higher now, although less of the commodity is availab le.

Moreove r,

because price would also be higher, it might will be construe d that
private storers had manipul ated the price.
Of course, such seeming ly perverse private market activity is partly
an artifac t of the particu lar storage costs and price ceiling .
example is by no means unique.

But this

If the cost of storage at small amounts of

storage were slightly less negativ e, private storage might even fall to
nothing over a middle range of availab ilities.

Furtherm ore, if, as is

general ly the case, the governm ent tried to defend a price band, rather than

15

adjust its storage continuousl y as market prices change, the private
reactions to such a crude policy could well seem even more perverse.
On

11

the other hand if the government attempted to take into account the

private reaction to its own actions, that is, to act as a Stackelberg leader,

a policy whose sophisticat ion is beyond any observed public storage
12
scheme, it can still induce seemingly perverse private behavior.
A casual observer of this market could well be forgiven for
inferring that private storage is collusive and manipulativ e.

Although

the diagnosis would be wrong, the natural prescriptio n - action against
boarding in times of scarcity - may well be socially desirable, despite
the general disapproval of economists, as we now show.
6.

The Desirabilit y of an Anti-Hoardi ng Policy

Suppose an anti-hoardin g law can be enacted that effectively liquidates
13
Such a law could
private stocks whenever the price ceiling is reached.
14
In this example, the
make a considerabl e improvement in social welfare.
present value of the dead-weight burden of the price ceiling amounts to 4.5%
15
Prohibiting
of the expenditure on the commodity in a typical period.
private storage at low levels of availability would reduce this dead-weight
loss by 65% of the loss.

Decentraliz ed public storage, of the type

considered above, without anti-hoardin g laws, actually increases the welfare
16
Given the
loss by 28% because of its perverse effect on private storage.
price ceiling, the best of the policies considered is to combine public
storage with anti-hoardin g laws aimed at private storers.
combination , 71% of the dead-weight loss can be recovered.

With that

16

The rational use of anti-hoardi ng laws, of course, illustrates the
general theory of the second best.

It is reasonable to believe some other

distortion, bad in its own right, might partly cancel out an initial
distortion.

Once price is controlled, public storage is a natural supple

ment for deficient private stockholdin g.

But public storage further

distorts private storage; the addition of anti-hoardin g laws moves the system
closer to the first-best world of no distortions .
7.

Conclusion
A storage monopoly in the grain market does not lead to excessive

withholding in times of scarcity; rather it results in far too little
carryover in both good and bad seasons.

Thus,anti-h oarding laws do not

address the problems caused by monopolisti c practices.

On the other hand,

because carryover stocks can have negative net storage costs, competitive
private storage behavior in the presence of a price ceiling may lead to
excessive withholding in times of scarcity.
competitive , may well appear collusive.

Such private behavior, although

This problem is exacerbated when

the government operates a public stockpile to mitigate the effects of the
price ceiling.

In this case the private storers may appear even more

socially undesirable , engaging in seemingly manipulativ e trading behavior,
even though they actually remain price-taker s.

If an anti-hoardin g law

prevents privately rational but socially excessive private holdings during
scarcities, it can improve social welfare.

Thus, anti-hoardin g laws may not

be so akin to laws against witchcraft after all, even if their proponents are
in error in believing that their social value comes from preventing
monopolisti c abuses.

FOOTNOTES

*This paper is based upon work supporte d by the Nationa l
Science Foundat ion under Grant No. DAR-7910287.
1 niis offense was denoted "regrati ng," or could be included
under wider charge "engros sing".

An excelle nt descrip tion of the English

laws regulati ng the corn trade is Gras (1915), especia lly Chapters V

and VI.
2

For a descript on of these laws see Chaudhary (1974), Hamid

(1974), Patel (1965), or Vyas and Bafna (1965).
3

Numerous recent example s of price controls are found in the

literatu re on India and Pakistan referred to above.

Referenc es to

past British measures are found in Smith (1784), Vol. 2, pp. 298-310 ,
Rashid (1980), Gras (1915~ and Barker (1920).

In England prices

were often indirec tly controll ed by allowing imports only above a
certain price, or, when an export surplus develope d, by prohibi ting
or taxing exports above a certain price.

In the United States, the

Nixon adminis tration imposed a brief embargo on soybean exports in
1973 to reduce domestic inflatio n of food prices.
4 The followin g transve rsality conditio ns (Samuelson (1971))
rule out infinite explosio n of storage or expected price:
Lim (1 + r)-T
T-+m

st = Lim (1 + r)-T EP •
t
r--

O

5
A descrip tion of the numeric al approach is availab le from the
authors .

F2

6

See Stiglitz (1976), footnote 2.

7For a discussion of accessibility in the context of inventory
theory, see Williams (1980).
8

Further numerical results not reported here confirm that these

conclusions about mnopoly would be the same if production were elastic,
or the demand curve had a different shape (e.g. linear), or marginal
storage costs were constant, although the exact storage rules would be
slightly different.
9In the undistorted case considered above, price exceeded
$112.50 approximately 25% of the time, and mean price was $103.75.
10
In this example the price ceiling is deterministic.

Even if the

price ceiling is higher, or expected at a given price with some probability
less than unity, qualitatively similar distortions of storage incentives
will occur.
1 ~xamples of apparently perverse private responses to arbitrary
price band or price peg government stockpiling rules are found in
Gardner (1979) and Salant (forthcoming).
1 2we exaained a similar numerical example (available from the
authors) in which we mdelled the government as a Stackelberg price
leader constrained to choose a time-consistent storage rule.

In

that case we observed, as in Figure 4, excessive storage at the
price ceiling, and private accumulation as prices rise to the ceiling,
but in addition we observed a private aarginal propensity to store
in excess of unity, and negative public marginal propensity to store,

F3

over a higher range of availabilities.

For a discussion of Stackelberg

public storage behavior and of the problems of deriving fully optimal
public storage behavior in a distorted market see Wright and Williams
(forthcoming 1982b).
131n this particular example, a prohibition on hoarding during
scarcities can be modelled by replacing the market price,

P, with

the shadow price P on the left hand side of the arbitrage conditions
for competitive storage, when a price ceiling is in force.

14 Social welfare is defined as the present value of expected surplus
arising from current storage and all future harvests and storage.

Assuming

a low income elasticity of demand or a low budget share, this can be
approximated (see Willig 1976) by the area under the consumption demand
curve minus production costs, if any, and storage costs.

Some of the

benefits accrue because of additional storage subsequently.

The expected

social value of current and future consumption, SV, is a function of current

storage.
ht+l+st- 5 t+l

SV (St)•

Et[ J

P(C t) dC t -

0

where

5

t+l

J

K~(St+l (ht+l+St))

0

.

C(ht) is the cost of production, which is in this case zero

because supply is perfectly inelastic.

This function is derived, as is

Et[Pt+l], by a process of successive numerical approximation.

When there are

no distortions,the marginal social value curve is the storage demand curve.

r
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15 Tbe present value of the dead-weight loss of monopoly in the
same example is approximate ly that of the price ceiling.

The dead

weight loss of a price ceiling if supply were responsive and affected
by the ceiling would be considerabl y larger.
16 If the government acted as a Stackelberg price leader with time

consistent behavior, welfare would be increased somewhat by public
storage even without an anti-hoardi ng law.

Nash public behavior would

also improve welfare if supply were sufficientl y elastic.
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